Indiana Law Journal
Volume 93
Issue 1 The Future of the U.S. Constitution: A
Symposium

Article 15

Winter 2018

Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?
A Winkler
UCLA School of Law, winkler@law.ucla.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Second Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Winkler, A (2018) "Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 93 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 15.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol93/iss1/15

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?
ADAM WINKLER
I.
It seems beyond question that the Second Amendment has never been more important in constitutional law. In the past decade, the Supreme Court for the first time
held that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual’s right to have handguns
in the home in District of Columbia v. Heller.1 The Court subsequently expanded the
protection for private gun ownership in McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 incorporating
the right to keep and bear arms to the states. The Second Amendment has been even
livelier in the lower federal courts, which have decided hundreds of gun rights cases
since Heller dealing with nearly every type of gun law on the books.
Nevertheless, if we think about the future of the Second Amendment, it may soon
become largely irrelevant. That is not to say that Heller will be overturned or that the
amendment will become less important as a rhetorical theme in debates over gun
policy. The opposite appears true; Heller is secure as a precedent and gun law opponents continue to invoke the Second Amendment frequently, and with considerable
success, on the floors of statehouses nationwide. With the National Rifle Association
(NRA) one of the nation’s leading political players and gun advocates in control of
Congress, the White House, and the majority of state legislatures, the Second
Amendment continues to have tremendous cultural and political significance. The
Second Amendment, however, may become increasingly irrelevant in one of the
most fundamental ways that matter to a constitutional provision: distinguishing lawful polices from unlawful ones. This sorting function is where the proverbial rubber
hits the road in constitutional analysis.3
Why might the Second Amendment cease to serve this vital constitutional function? The explanation begins with the difference between how the Second
Amendment is invoked in political debates and how the amendment is invoked in
court. There are, it seems, two Second Amendments. There is a Judicial Second
Amendment comprised of court decisions interpreting the provision, and there is an
Aspirational Second Amendment that is used in political dialogue. These two versions of the Second Amendment are different; the aspirational one is far more hostile
to gun laws than the judicial one.
Moreover, the Aspirational Second Amendment is overtaking the Judicial Second
Amendment in American law. In the vast majority of states, the gun laws that people
live with are largely a product of the Aspirational Second Amendment as it has been
articulated by gun advocates and elected lawmakers. Ironically, the same political
forces that led to the reinvigoration of the Second Amendment and the Heller

 Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I’m grateful to the participants at Indiana
Law Journal Symposium on the Future of the Constitution for feedback on this Essay, to the
Review for providing this forum, and to Lucy Jackson for her excellent research.
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
3. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 733
(2007).
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decision are also helping to sap the Judicial Second Amendment of its role in
separating out good laws from bad ones. This is a sign of gun advocates’ political
success, not political failure: state law is embracing such a robust, anti-regulatory
view of the right to keep and bear arms that the Judicial Second Amendment, at least
as currently construed, seems likely to have less and less to say about the shape of
America’s gun laws.
Of course, the future is unpredictable. And in the paradoxical world of guns, the
amendment that seems increasingly irrelevant could alternatively be transformed in
the opposite direction to become far more significant in American law than the
Second Amendment—or any state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to
bear arms—has ever been.
II.
When an issue of public policy arises with constitutional implications, the traditional analysis of lawyers about the policy’s constitutionality will turn on how the
underlying constitutional provision has been construed by the courts. For instance,
when someone suggests banning hate speech a typical response might be to say, “But
the First Amendment does not allow that. The courts have held there is no exception
for hate speech.” This is an argument based on how the First Amendment is interpreted and applied by the courts. Given the judicial doctrine on free speech, a law
punishing hate speech would be unconstitutional. Reference to court decisions is not
the only way to make a sound constitutional argument, although it is perhaps the
most common way.
If we were to ask a similar question about the constitutionality of a gun law, we
might well look to the Judicial Second Amendment for the answer. This version of
the Second Amendment is determined by Supreme Court decisions like Heller,
McDonald, and, more recently, Caetano v. Massachusetts. In June 2016, the Court
unanimously reversed a state supreme court decision holding stun guns were not
arms protected by the Second Amendment.4 The Court’s per curiam opinion in
Caetano, which included the justices who dissented in Heller and McDonald, unambiguously endorsed Heller, made clear that arms other than handguns were protected
by the amendment, and returned the case to the state court for appropriate reconsideration. The decision signals that Heller is secure as a precedent.5
Under the Supreme Court’s decisions, the Second Amendment guarantees individuals the right to have handguns in the home for self-defense. That right applies
against both state and federal governments, and it protects access to at least some
arms other than handguns.6 Heller suggested also, without affirmatively deciding,
that a number of gun laws did not run afoul of the Second Amendment. In a significant paragraph, Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion indicated that the Second
Amendment did not call into question bans on possession by felons and the mentally
ill, restrictions on guns in sensitive places like schools and government buildings,

4. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
5. Id.
6. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635
(2008).
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and laws regulating the commercial sale of firearms. The Court also observed that
while bearing arms is not restricted to military use, complete prohibitions on concealed carry had been upheld in some circumstances. “[T]he right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited,” Scalia wrote.7
The Judicial Second Amendment is also given shape by lower court decisions,
such as the rulings of the federal courts of appeals on issues the Supreme Court has
yet to decide. Heller and McDonald spurred a tremendous amount of litigation over
gun laws in states across the nation. As a result, the federal circuits have decided
Second Amendment cases on a wide variety of issues. Yet there has been remarkable
uniformity of results.8 The courts have gravitated towards an intermediate form of
scrutiny that requires laws burdening activity protected by the amendment to be substantially related to important government interests.9 Applying this standard, the circuit courts have upheld a wide variety of laws, including three that are at the center
of the current gun debate: discretionary permitting for concealed carry,10 bans on
military-style assault weapons,11 and restrictions on high-capacity magazines.12
Although the lower courts have consistently upheld the federal law prohibiting
felons and the mentally ill from possessing firearms as against facial challenges,13
some courts have held that particular individuals subject to the ban can bring asapplied challenges.14 If convicted of a nonviolent offense a long time ago or adjudicated mentally ill in an isolated, stale incident, a person might be able to win
restoration of her gun rights. Although as-applied challenges are commonplace in

7. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
8. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY, 4
(2017) http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-2017April.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U8R-A889] [hereinafter LITIGATION SUMMARY].
9. See, e.g., Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 347 n.9 (1st Cir. 2015) (listing cases that
have employed the two-prong approach); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir.
2013) (“Like several of our sister circuits, we have found that ‘a two-part approach to Second
Amendment claims seems appropriate under Heller.’” (quoting United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010))).
10. See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc);
Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879–80; Drake
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d
Cir. 2012). But see Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (invalidating
the District of Columbia’s discretionary permitting law).
11. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d
406 (7th Cir. 2015); Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015); Heller v.
District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
12. See, e.g., Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 137; Friedman, 784 F.3d at 411–12; Fyock, 779 F.3d at
996–97.
13. See United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281, 282 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (listing
cases affirming the constitutionality of the restriction from “every other circuit to consider the
issue”); see also LITIGATION SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that “[b]ecause Heller suggested these ‘presumptively lawful’ regulations fall outside the scope of the Second
Amendment, most courts have had little trouble upholding them”).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011).
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constitutional law, in the Second Amendment context they pose unusual challenges.
There are millions of people subject to these bans, each of whom may be entitled to
an evidentiary hearing in federal court, putting some considerable strain on already
overloaded dockets.
Moreover, there is not an obvious judicially manageable standard for determining
who should have their rights restored. In a recent case, the Third Circuit suggested
relief would be appropriate if one can “show that he is no more dangerous than a
typical law-abiding citizen.”15 That rather abstract question is impossible to answer,
as it relies on predictions about the future dangerousness of the challenger and comparisons to a baseline of dangerousness of the average person that cannot ever be
known. It also presents quite a burden for prosecutors. Given that those who would
petition for a hearing would likely have no recent convictions, prosecutors will have
to conduct time-consuming investigations into the details of a petitioner’s personal
and work life in a search for signs of dangerousness that are ambiguous at best. And
already overloaded prosecutors are unlikely to prioritize such investigations over
those designed to solve recent crimes.
Despite the as-applied cases, the broader trend in the courts has been to uphold
most forms of gun control.16 This should come as little surprise. Although the Second
Amendment case law is new, nearly every state guarantees individuals the right to
bear arms in its own state constitution and there are nearly two hundred years of case
law interpreting these provisions. Prior to Heller, state supreme courts across the
nation read the right to bear arms to permit “reasonable regulation,” which typically
meant that gun laws were upheld so long as they did not “destroy” or “nullify” the
right entirely.17 Despite wide demographic and political differences, states before
Heller were uniform in their use of the reasonable regulation standard for gun laws
—red states and blue states, north and south, east and west. As under Heller, the
overwhelming majority of gun laws survived judicial scrutiny.18
Although the jurisprudential results of a reinvigorated Second Amendment were
predictably similar to the outcomes seen for decades in state court right-to-bear-arms
decisions, there have been complaints that the courts have neutered Heller. In a 2013
filing with the Court, Paul Clement, a well-respected lawyer who was representing
the NRA, argued that the lower federal courts had engaged in “massive resistance to
this court’s decisions,” evoking the pushback by southern states to Brown v. Board
of Education.19 In June 2017, when the Supreme Court declined to hear Peruta v.
California on the constitutionality of discretionary permitting for concealed carry,20
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by the Court’s newest member, Justice Neil
Gorsuch, dissented from the denial of certiorari and argued the courts were treating

15. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011).
16. Of the over 1150 post-Heller court decisions tracked by the Law Center to Prevent
Gun Violence at the state and federal level, Second Amendment challenges have been rejected
ninety-four percent of the time. Litigation Summary, supra note 8, at 2.
17. Winkler, supra note 3, at 688.
18. See id.
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives, No. 13-137 (U.S. July 29, 2013).
20. Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017).
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“the Second Amendment as a disfavored right.”21 Among the evidence: in the preceding seven years, the Court had not “heard argument” in a single Second
Amendment case, compared to “roughly 35 cases where the question presented
turned on the meaning of the First Amendment and 25 cases that turned on the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”22
Even though Thomas was correct that the Court had not “heard argument” in a
Second Amendment case, the Justices had nonetheless decided Caetano just the term
before. One reason the Court has been able to avoid taking more Second Amendment
cases is that there have not been many significant circuit splits. The best predictor of
whether the Justices will take a case is the existence of directly contrary decisions by
the courts of appeals on an issue.23 One of the Court’s primary roles is to ensure a
measure of uniformity on matters of constitutional law, and when the circuit courts
are in agreement the justices often stay out of disputes. When the justices considered
whether to take Peruta, for example, every circuit court to decide the question had
ultimately ruled that discretionary permitting is permissible under the Second
Amendment.24 (As this Essay was being published, the D.C. Circuit invalidated a
discretionary permitting law; that case was not appealed to the Supreme Court.25) A
similar situation exists with regard to restrictions on military-style assault weapons
and high-capacity magazines, which have also been upheld by every circuit to rule
to date.26 There simply is not that much disagreement in the federal courts of appeals
about the scope of the Judicial Second Amendment.
Nonetheless, Thomas’s dissent illustrates the frustration among some that Heller
has not gone further to undermine restrictive gun laws. One source of this grievance
is the fact that we have two Second Amendments: one in the courts and one in the
aspirational politics of gun enthusiasts. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch subscribe to a
broader, expansive vision of the right to keep and bear arms more in tune with the
Aspirational Second Amendment than the Judicial Second Amendment.
III.
The Aspirational Second Amendment is the version of the amendment whose substance derives primarily from political discourse around guns and the arguments of

21. Id. at 1999 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a); see also ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHANIE M.
SHAPIRO & KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 226 (8th ed. 2002) (noting that
the Supreme Court often “will grant certiorari where the decision of a federal court of appeals
. . . is in direct conflict with a decision of another court of appeals”).
24. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Peterson
v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 879–80
(4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
25. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
26. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d
406 (7th Cir. 2015); Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015); Heller v.
District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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the gun rights movement. When a gun law comes up for consideration, the
Aspirational Second Amendment is the one that the NRA and its allies argue must
be followed. Yet the Second Amendment they mean is not the Judicial Second
Amendment; advocates do not focus on the judicial decisions authoritatively interpreting the Second Amendment. Rather, they argue that law must comply with a
version of the Second Amendment that is informed by political advocacy on behalf
of gun rights.
The Aspirational Second Amendment is quite different from the Judicial Second
Amendment. According to gun advocates, the right to keep and bear arms goes much
further than the current judicial doctrine, requiring more access to guns and prohibiting a far greater range of gun laws than the Second Amendment in the courts. Under
the Aspirational Second Amendment, individuals not only have a right to own
handguns; they also have a right to military-style assault rifles. High-capacity magazines are also arms protected by the Second Amendment and cannot be banned.
Individuals have the right to carry weapons in public, either openly or concealed, and
states can only impose minimal, objective requirements to obtain a permit to carry
(what is known as “shall-issue” permitting). When carrying their guns in public, people have a right under the Aspirational Second Amendment to go nearly anywhere
there is not specialized security such as schools, bars, and churches.
A good example of the Aspirational Second Amendment is the recent push by gun
advocates to eliminate all permitting for concealed carry. In recent years, advocates
have promoted the idea of “constitutional carry”: the notion that the Second
Amendment is the only permit a person needs to be able to carry their guns in public.27 They explicitly ground this understanding of gun rights in the Constitution,
even though there has never been an authoritative decision by any federal court (or,
for that matter, any state or local court) saying that individuals have a right to carry
firearms in public without a permit. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any court in modern
society ruling that way. Advocates nonetheless insist that their vision of gun rights
is based on the Constitution when it is in fact grounded in an idealized vision of what
the Constitution says.
It is common for interest groups to have different understandings of constitutional
values than the courts.28 What makes the Second Amendment unusual is that the
aspirational version of this right plays a greater role in shaping the law on the ground
than the judicial version. Because the gun rights movement has been so successful at
the state level, the gun laws of the overwhelming majority of states—forty-one of
them as of this writing—by and large reflect the Aspirational Second Amendment.
Moreover, this movement has also worked to shape federal gun laws to reflect this
version of the amendment. In recent years, gun advocates have defeated efforts to
reauthorize the expiring assault weapons ban, expand background checks, and add
suspected terrorists to a no-buy list for guns.
When gun laws are proposed, many lawmakers avoid discussion of the Judicial
Second Amendment, save perhaps to cite the Heller case. Instead, when deliberating

27. See Adam Weinstein, Understanding ‘Constitutional Carry,’ the Gun-Rights
Movement Sweeping the Country, TRACE (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thetrace.org/2017
/02/constitutional-carry-gun-rights-movement-explained [https://perma.cc/RY8E-5RML].
28. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016).
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and debating a proposed gun law, these lawmakers refer instead to the Aspirational
Second Amendment—the one envisioned by the NRA and gun advocates that is far
more expansive in its protection for guns. So instead of just arguing that a proposed
gun law is good or bad in its public policy impact, these lawmakers justify their support or opposition based on this judicially unmoored understanding of the Second
Amendment. Standard arguments about the constitutionality of a law based on judicial doctrine are largely brushed aside. It does not matter much what the courts say
the Second Amendment means.
Again, the significance of this variation is largely in the law on the ground.
Because lawmakers subscribing to the Aspirational Second Amendment hold the majority in most statehouses and now in Congress, it is that version that is gaining relevance. The judicial one, however, is seemingly becoming increasingly irrelevant to
how the gun laws in most of America work. The gun laws of the majority of states
have far outpaced judicial doctrine. If the Supreme Court had followed the suggestion of Justices Thomas and Gorsuch and heard Peruta, the outcome of the case
would not have had any impact on those states, no matter which way the Court ruled.
If the Court struck down discretionary permitting or upheld it, the ruling would not
impact states that already have shall-issue or no permitting requirements. The same
can be said about potential Supreme Court rulings on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. Given the strength of the gun rights movement at the state and
federal level, what the Supreme Court says about the scope of the Second
Amendment is all but meaningless in much of the country.
IV.
There are a handful of states for which the Judicial Second Amendment still matters. The gun movement has yet to sway nine states—California, New York,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Connecticut, New Jersey, Hawaii, Delaware, and Rhode
Island—and the District of Columbia, which have not adopted the Aspirational
Second Amendment. That is not to say that gun rights are nonexistent in these
holdouts. Under the Judicial Second Amendment they are still required to allow any
law-abiding person of age to possess firearms in the home for personal protection.
Even prior to Heller, gun politics were such that there had been no significant push
to prohibit possession of firearms in the home even in these places in decades. (New
York City is unusual in that it requires a permit to have any gun in the home.29) Some
firearms are off limits, and these states and the District of Columbia have moved to
expand those restrictions recently.
Yet while the laws of the holdouts have passed muster under the Judicial Second
Amendment, they would run afoul of the Aspirational Second Amendment. Although
each of these states and the District of Columbia formally allow people to carry guns
in public with a permit, they have discretionary permitting that allows a local law
enforcement officer to decide whether a person has a particular individualized need
for armed protection in public.30 In practice, this is often equivalent to an effective
ban on carrying a concealed weapon in public—and in California, where open carry

29. See R.C.N.Y, tit. 38, §§ 5-01, 5-02 (2010).
30. See Concealed Carry, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (July 22, 2016),
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is prohibited, it can be a total ban on carrying any firearm. 31 Under the Aspirational
Second Amendment, this type of regime is clearly unconstitutional, but under the
Judicial Second Amendment, these policies remain permissible. Also found in this
handful of states are laws restricting the sale or possession of military-style assault
weapons and high-capacity magazines, waiting periods, and universal background
checks. All of these laws too would easily pass muster in court—and several have
consistently been upheld already—but not if measured against the Aspirational
Second Amendment.
The gulf between the states in the two competing camps is only becoming larger
in the wake of the Newtown mass shooting in December 2012. The federal government did not pass any new gun legislation after Newtown, despite a strong push
from President Barack Obama. In the states, however, there has been a tremendous
amount of legislative activity on guns. 32 Among the nine states with stricter gun
laws, there have been a number of new restrictions enacted. At the same time, many
of the other forty-one states have passed laws loosening gun possession even
further, as exemplified by Georgia’s “guns everywhere” law. 33 In fact, by one
count, there have been more laws passed easing gun possession than laws passed
restricting guns.34 For some in America, Newtown was a warning that we have to
do more to limit guns; for others, it was proof that limits on guns do not work and
that more people should be armed.
Proponents of the Aspirational Second Amendment would like to see their
vision adopted by the courts, and they have fought to secure such rulings in recent
years. In the wake of Heller, their success has been limited. Yet they continue to
find success in the legislative branches. On concealed carry, gun advocates may
well find in Congress the victory over discretionary permitting the courts have
denied them. One of the NRA’s highest legislative priorities for the Trump
administration is a “national reciprocity” law. 35 There are two basic reciprocity
proposals: a tourist version and a resident version. The tourist version would allow
a person who has a concealed carry permit at home to carry a gun while on the

http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry [https://perma
.cc/UQW7-4HPT].
31. See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, Gun Owners Hope To Win the Right To Carry Concealed
Weapons, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/20/local/la-meright-to-carry-20120220/2 [https://perma.cc/W6KH-ZX3U] (discussing the difficulty of obtaining permits under California’s discretionary “may-issue” law).
32. See Karen Yourish, Wilson Andrews, Larry Buchanan & Alan McLean, State Gun
Laws Enacted in the Year After Newtown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2013/12/10/us/state-gun-laws-enacted-in-the-year-since-newtown.html
[https://perma.cc/H43J-PF8F] (analyzing the 109 gun laws passed at the state level in 2013).
33. Safe Carry Protection Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127 (2014).
34. Of the 109 state gun laws enacted in the year following the Newtown shooting, 70
loosened gun restrictions, while only 39 tightened them. See Yourish et al., supra note 32.
35. See Dan Friedman, National Concealed-Carry ‘Reciprocity’: The NRA’s Next Big
Push, Explained, TRACE (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.thetrace.org/2017/04/nra-nationalconcealed-carry-reciprocity-explained [https://perma.cc/9RY2-2TAV]; see also Concealed
Carry Reciprocity Effort Gains Steam in Congress, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (June 9,
2017),
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20170609/concealed-carry-reciprocity-effort-gainssteam-in-congress [https://perma.cc/DJS5-GTQ6].
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road. So a Virginian with a permit who comes to California on vacation can carry
while on vacation.36
The resident version of reciprocity would allow a Californian to obtain a permit
online from Virginia and carry at home in California. Whereas tourist reciprocity
would lead to some more guns on the street, the resident version would effectively
gut discretionary permitting. Local residents could easily obtain a permit from a
shall-issue state—some, like Virginia, do not require an applicant to be a
resident—and carry on his own city’s streets. The discretionary permitting states
would become, for all intents and purposes, shall-issue. If resident reciprocity
passes, the constitutional debate over discretionary permitting becomes largely
meaningless. Whatever the courts say about discretionary permitting will not
impact the law on the ground.
Proponents of the Aspirational Second Amendment are promoting another reform that could further marginalize the Judicial Second Amendment: strict scrutiny
amendments to state constitutional right-to-bear-arms provisions. As mentioned
earlier, state courts traditionally apply a relatively deferential reasonable regulation
standard under these state constitutional guarantees. Disappointed with the results,
gun advocates have won ballot measures in Louisiana and Missouri amending
those states’ constitutions to require courts to apply strict scrutiny to right to bea r
arms disputes.37 They are explicitly transforming the right to bear arms in the courts
to look more like the Aspirational Second Amendment.
Strict scrutiny ballot initiatives further reduce the on-the-ground import of the
Judicial Second Amendment. Litigants in the affected states will choose to challenge state gun laws under state constitutional right-to-bear-arms provisions instead of the Second Amendment because of the former’s more rigorous standard
of review. Strict scrutiny should mean that more of those challenges succeed than
they would under Heller—at least in theory38—so lawyers will direct litigation into
the state courts. The overall impact of these ballot measures, however, is limited
in that they do not apply to federal laws and are most likely to be adopted in states
whose laws already reflect the permissiveness of the Aspirational Second
Amendment.
V.
While the gap between the Judicial Second Amendment and the Aspirational
Second Amendment grows, the strict scrutiny initiatives nevertheless remind us
how political movements reshape constitutional doctrine in the courts. Scholars
have long described how our fundamental rights are shaped by nonjudicial actors,

36. This terminology of “tourist” reciprocity and “resident” reciprocity is my own. An
example of the tourist version is the Senate bill sponsored by Senator John Cornyn, while an
example of the resident version is the House bill sponsored by Representative Richard Hudson.
See Friedman, supra note 35; Michele Gorman, Guns in America: What Is National Concealed
Carry Reciprocity? NEWSWEEK (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/what-nationalconcealed-carry-reciprocity-563075 [https://perma.cc/W6GD-4SNH].
37. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 2012); MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 2014).
38. See Winkler, supra note 3, at 727–28.
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such as Congress, presidents, state legislators, interest groups, and common citizens.39 There may be no better example than the Second Amendment.40
When Heller came down, it was heralded as the “triumph of originalism” because
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion purported to base the decision on the original public
meaning of the Second Amendment.41 Yet, Heller was also a reflection of how popular movements can change constitutional law. For most of American history, the
ambiguity of the Second Amendment’s text was sufficient to raise questions about
the scope and nature of the right. While lawyers sometimes claimed the Second
Amendment protected an individual right—consider Chief Justice Roger Taney’s
statement in Dred Scott v. Sandford that citizenship for African Americans would
extend to them the right “to keep and carry arms wherever they went”42—the federal
courts since the 1930s had adopted a militia-centered view.43 For years, not even the
NRA promoted the individual-rights view of the Second Amendment.44 In the 1930s,
NRA president Karl Frederick wrote that “enlightened public sentiment” and “intelligent legislative action” gave protection to individuals’ access to guns in the home:
“It is not to be found in the Constitution.”45
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, however, a vigorous and active social movement arose that breathed new life into the Second Amendment. In an era of rising
crime rates and growing disenchantment with government’s ability to solve social
problems, many Americans began to view access to guns for self-defense as a fundamental right.46 This shift was reflected in the transformation of the NRA. The organization had supported the ultimate passage of the federal laws known as the Gun
Control Act of 1968—which restricted who could purchase a gun, barred the importation of certain firearms, and created the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
to enforce federal gun laws47—and the leaders of the organization supported a variety
of gun safety measures, including waiting periods and restrictive licensing for concealed carry.48 Seeking to withdraw from gun politics, the NRA’s leaders even

39. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 2001); see also Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2003) (arguing that “constitutional law could not
plausibly proceed without incorporating the values and beliefs of nonjudicial actors”).
40. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 194 (2008) (arguing that in the context of the Second Amendment,
practices of democratic constitutionalism enable nonjudicial actors to “contest and shape popular beliefs about the Constitution’s original meaning and so confer upon courts the authority
to enforce the nation’s foundational commitments”).
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008); Linda Greenhouse, 3
Defining Opinions, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13
/weekinreview/13greebox.html [https://perma.cc/G6SL-DUQU].
42. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
43. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT 65 (2d ed. 2013).
45. Id. at 212.
46. See id. at 96–97.
47. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; see also Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
48. WINKLER, supra note 44, at 64–65, 210–12, 253–54.
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planned to close up the Washington office, move headquarters to Colorado, and focus
on hunting. A group of dissident members who thought guns were not for shooting
ducks but for self-protection against criminals took over the NRA, rededicating it to
waging political battle against gun laws. The new leadership subscribed to a vibrant
and expansive Second Amendment far greater in its constitutional protection than
that offered by judicial doctrine.49
Although Heller is perhaps the most high-profile illustration of the NRA’s success
in furthering its vision, the most significant thing the transformed NRA did for the
past forty years was to adopt a political rather than litigation strategy for protecting
the right to bear arms. Although active today in court, prior to the Heller case the
NRA did not focus on trying to persuade judges of its view of the Second
Amendment. Instead of pursuing litigation, the NRA focused its efforts on mobilizing citizens, especially gun owners, and electing officials who could repeal restrictive
gun laws. Indeed, after 1986, the NRA propelled the wave of reform at the state level
to make it easier to carry guns in public, including the replacement of discretionary
permitting for concealed carry and lifting of prohibitions on guns in churches, bars,
and college campuses. By adopting a political strategy rather than a legal one, the
NRA not only changed the state of gun laws in the majority of states but also built
up a large coalition of supportive lawmakers across the nation. As a result, the
Aspirational Second Amendment has been adopted in most of America through legislation, not judicial decision.
The question for the future is whether the Aspirational Second Amendment,
which so effectively shifted judicial doctrine in Heller, will eventually propel the
courts to embrace an even more vibrant, gun-protective reading of the Second
Amendment. Perhaps it will. Scholars have argued that the Supreme Court, rather
than being a legal innovator on rights issues, often serves to stamp out outliers who
fail to conform to a national consensus.50 At least one metric of a national consensus
is state law, and the Aspirational Second Amendment has been adopted by the vast
majority of states. Indeed, if President Donald Trump or any foreseeable Republican
successor names the next few Justices to the Supreme Court, the Judicial Second
Amendment might be transformed to look much more like the Aspirational Second
Amendment in short order. The Judicial Second Amendment would become far more
important, reshaping the law of the nine holdout states and perhaps even that of the
federal government.
The impact of such a revamping of state law is hard to estimate, given that gun
laws often suffer from widespread noncompliance already. Like laws on recreational
drugs, gun laws regulate small, easy to conceal items that people feel passionate
about. As a result, many people knowingly disobey gun laws. After Sunnyvale,
California, banned the possession of high-capacity magazines in 2013, police reported that no magazines had been voluntarily turned in.51 That same year, New York

49. Id. at 65–68.
50. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996).
51. Chip Johnson, One Gun Control Attempt That Misfires, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/johnson/article/One-gun-control-attempt-that-misfires6791466.php [https://perma.cc/4MTM-PNAG].
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required the registration of assault weapons but only an estimated five percent of the
firearms were registered.52 So it may be that many of the restrictive gun laws that
might be called into question by the Aspirational Second Amendment are not being
followed today anyway.
Laws requiring a permit to carry a concealed firearm may be obeyed more often
than magazine bans or registration requirements, in part because illegally carrying a
gun in public is more likely to be enforced than a law targeting guns or magazine
kept at home. Here, there are some numbers that give a hint of how adoption of the
Aspirational Second Amendment would impact major cities in those nine states and
D.C. Under its current discretionary permitting regime, Los Angeles County, with a
population just over 10 million, has less than 400 civilians (other than law enforcement) allowed to carry concealed weapons.53 In Aspirational Second Amendment
states that make concealed carry permits readily available, about 4–6% of the population obtains one.54 If that number held in Los Angeles, that would mean 400,000–
600,000 more residents authorized to carry. A similar explosion in carry permits
would be expected in New York City, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Honolulu,
Baltimore, and Trenton.
While those numbers are alarming, they must be understood in the context of the
Aspirational Second Amendment’s previous success. The gun rights movement has
already revised state laws to allow easy concealed carry in many states, and plenty
of major cities—Phoenix, Houston, Philadelphia, and Indianapolis—have large numbers of gun carriers. The social science data on the impact of permissive carry laws
is inconclusive; many thoughtful and careful empirical studies have been done, some
showing that they increase violence and others that they decrease violence.55
Probably the best we can say at this point is that we do not know exactly what the
impact is. Certainly, the worst fears of opponents of concealed carry, who warned of
America becoming a new Wild West, have not materialized. In fact, crime in recent
years has been historically low.56 And while that is not likely due to permissive carry
laws, those laws have certainly not led to huge spikes in crime.

52. Adam Winkler, Why Gavin Newsom’s Gun Law Won’t Help, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0408-winkler-gavin-newsom-gun-initiative20160408-story.html [https://perma.cc/7G5Y-2BDU].
53. A list of the fewer than 400 Los Angeles County residents permitted to carry a concealed firearm can be found at https://www.scribd.com/document/125393888/CCWLicensees-LA-County [https://perma.cc/84BR-W8BV].
54. See Adam Winkler, Want Fewer Guns on California Streets? Open Carry May Be the
Answer, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/23/opinion/la-oewinkler-gun-control-open-carry-20140223 [https://perma.cc/XN6L-RV4B].
55. Compare John J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja & Kyle D. Weber, Right-To-Carry Laws
and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level
Synthetic Controls Analysis 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23510,
2017) (concluding that right-to-carry laws “lead to substantial increases in violent crime”),
with John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-To-Carry Concealed
Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1997) (finding that “allowing citizens to carry concealed
weapons deters violent crimes”).
56. MATTHEW FRIEDMAN, AMES C. GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, CRIME TRENDS: 1990–2016, at 1–3 (2017) (finding that America’s overall crime rate
has “dropped precipitously in the last quarter-century” to historic lows).
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Nevertheless, if the Aspirational Second Amendment transforms the Judicial
Second Amendment, and with it the laws of nine states, it would be an
unprecedented feat for a constitutional right to bear arms provision. Over the
course of American history, we have lived under the Second Amendment and
dozens of similar state constitution guarantees. Rarely, however, have these
provisions been read to broadly reshape the gun laws of even a single state. From
time to time, courts have invalidated an important gun law, such as Georgia’s ban
on concealable weapons in 1846 57 and Washington, D.C.’s ban on handguns in
2008.58 Yet, one of the consistent themes in the constitutional history of the right
to bear arms is that courts read such provisions narrowly to allow lawmakers
considerable leeway to regulate guns in the interest of public safety. For the
Supreme Court to read the Second Amendment to overhaul the gun laws of a
significant portion of the country would be not just controversial but historic.
In the end, however, the Aspirational Second Amendment seems destined to continue to dictate the gun laws in most of America, regardless of what happens with the
Judicial Second Amendment. If there is an overarching lesson, it is that building a
political movement around an aspirational vision of the Constitution can be more
effective and durable than high-profile judicial victories. Constitutional values can
often be, and in the case of the Second Amendment clearly are, best protected and
preserved through political mobilization not the courts.

57. Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
58. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

